THE REBIRTH OF DEMOCRACY?

Von Jean-Marie Guéhenno

A)

The progress of democracy in the past two centuries has been linked to the consolidation of nation-states.

1 - Communities have been produced by the combined forces of geography and history, rather than by democratically-ratified decisions: the democratic debate has focused on the distribution and use of power within a given community rather than on the definition of the community.

2 - Democracy has worked when the sense of belonging in the same community was strong enough to prevent the majority from abusing its power against the minority, and the minority from rejecting the decisions taken by the majority.

3 - The territorial base of the nation-state provided a clear and convenient definition of the community, because it reconciled the need for identity with the need for functional efficiency: when the economy was dominated by agriculture and industry, space was what mattered most, and the nation-state could be seen as an extension of the city state: it was the political answer to the industrial age and its requirement for bigger markets and economies of scale.

4 - The hierarchical structure of the decision-making process was well tailored to the new democratic institutions: small decisions derived from big decisions and principles, so that Parliament, by controlling big decisions through the law-making process, could reasonably expect to control the whole machinery of government. 

B)

This setup is being eroded by the forces of globalisation.

1 - More than a change of scale, territory becomes less relevant. Today's challenge to democracy amounts to more than a broadening of the territorial base of democratic institutions, because globalisation is more than another change of scale, that would move us trom the age of nation-states to the age of continental states. When wealth creation is more and more dematerialized, space becomes less relevant, and the market can be truly global. There is not a single political institution that can claim to have full responsibility for the future of its citizens, and that sense of loss of control undermines the confidence of citizens in their democratic institutions. This evolution has weakened our democratic institutions without providing an alternative: the dream of a world government remains as utopian as ever, since a global economy does not produce a global community; on the contrary, it reinforces the need for a sense of belonging in a community that is not just functional, but that would also provide an emotional identity. Communitarism and fragmentation are not relics of a disappearing past era but products of our globalised age. Actually, the scope of democratic debate is being broadened, as the definiton of the community becomes a legitimate issue for debate instead of being a starting point. But this apparent progress of democracy has dangerous implications: the sense of belonging in a given community, which made democratic institutions sustainable and eventually led to the solidarity of the welfare state, which was a self perpetuating process, because it in turn reinforced the sense of belonging, is being eroded. Some of us will more and more have the option of choosing our community and the degree to which we commit ourselves to that community. This new freedom may result in a juxtaposition of tightly-knit small communities of choice, often non territorial, with little sense of broader solidarities.

 2 - A change in the decision-making process is occuring: the development of specialized knowledges and the progress of information technologies (improved reporting procedures) is changing the risk/reward balance between centralized control and decentralized management in favour of decentralized management. In many instances, quick small decision, that can be quickly reversed are more efficient than slow big decisions taken at a level which is too removed from daily operational concerns. This evolution has been more visible in business than in government, but it also affects public affairs, and changes the assumptions on which democratic institutions have been built. Control of big decisions does not entail control of small decisions, and efficiency often means more autonomy and decentralization.

C)

How can European integration provide answers in this new context.

1 - Europe is not going to be, and should not be a new state, a "continental state". The balance of power and the concert des nations produced disasters when they were tried at the state level. Think of what would happen if we tried a "concert of continents" ! This means that the ultimate goal of European integration should be not European independence, or European power for the sake of power, but a democratic claim for participation in the decisions that affect our future of European citizens. In that respect, it is essentiell to establish a more balanced relationship with the United States without alienating them. The transatlantic relationship should be more than a competition for power. The sharing of sovereignty which we have organised between the member states should not stop at the borders of Europe. Actually, contrary to traditional states, we should blur borders rather than clarify them.

2 - The European Union, until now, has been quite different from traditional democracies: the European budget, important as it is, is very small in comparison of national budgets, and the control of the budget is not, in the European case, the founding act of democracy. The strength of Europeen institutions is in the production of norms and regulations, which, by and large, are often produced without much parliamentary participation, even if the Amsterdam treaty strengthens the European Parliament. Actually, the strength of the European Union derives in part from a new definition of what is technical and what is political.

3 - lt is in that respect significant that the next step of its development - the creation of an independent European central bank - will enshrine the retreat of government and politics from a domain which was long considered an essential attribute of political sovereignty, and that we expect political progress from a decision that excludes politics from monetary policy.

4 - Democracy at the European level cannot simply be the transposition of national institutions. Of course, it is easier to negotiate with the USA at the European level, for traditional reasons of power, and some issues obviously require answers that go bayond individual states. But the challenge that is posed to democracy is more, as we have noted, than a challenge of size. The European polity does not have the strength of national polities, and we wrongly assume that our national institutions are satisfactory, and that it is enough to replicate them at a higher level, while in fact, adding layers to the pyramid of institutions without redefining the role of government may reinforce the feeling of many citizens that the political process is remote and not transparent. The multiplication of layers in a pyramidal structure is the opposite of what is taking place in the business world: improvement in reporting procedures made possible by progress in information technologies leads to the disappearance of intermediate layers, and a multiplication of smaller units. The corporate headquarters define procedures, set goals, allocate funds, and review performance. We have to think about that model and modernise federaliam.

5 - Politics is going to be more and more about transparency and about solidarity.

Transparency, because it is necessary to guaranty that the links and connections that will proliferate between various organisations in a networked society are subject to public scrutiny and contribute to the fluidity and transparency of the political process, rather than impede it. Accountability will ultimately depend on a decentralisation of control that will be the product of transparency, and should accompany the decentralization of power.

Solidarity because, as we move from inherited communities to communities of choice, the political debate will focus less on the services provided by the state to a given community, and more on the definition of the community that may enjoy services, and how it pays for them (pay per unit, insurance, tax, social security...). The managerial role of government will decrease and the extent of solidarity will become the key political issue; in Europe as in other developed parts of the world, the political question will no more be who runs the local school, or police station, or post office, and how should it be run, but who pays for it: the local community, the region, the state, Europe.

Does that mean that eventually more money will have to be redistributed through the European budget? Probably, but that will be acceptable to citizens only if two conditions are met:

- Transfers should not be confused with management, and European institutions will have to resist the temptation to "micro manage" Europe: if that is the case, citizens will suspect that this is just another attempt of politicians to take power away from them. In that sense, transparency and solidarity are linked.

- Transfers will be sustainable only in as far as European citizens feel they belong in the same community

Conclusion

This is our greatest challenge: there is a built-in tension between transparency and solidarity just as there is one between the need to address global issues at a global level and the trend toward ever more fragmented communities.

lf we make more and more information available through transparency, we increase the risk that smaller and smaller communities will "want their money back", and reject any broader solidarity in which they have no interest. lf we withold information in order to prevent further fragmentation, we loose the legitimacy of democratic accountability.

Likewise, if we concentrate power at a high level to manage global issues, we run the risk of centralized technocratic authoritarianism, if we dilute power, we may lose the possibility of managing global issues.

The European Union, if it is to be democratic, will have to reconcile these conflicting objectives, but it will find that consensus-building becomes a more and more difficult process, and that democratic governments are often paralysed. The balance between the utopia of "good government", which is the necessary ambition of all democracies, but creates the temptation to concentrate power and can degenerate into totalitarianism - as we have learnt from the 20th century -, and the need to control power through devolution and dilution will therefore become ever more precarious.

Tomorrow’s world, if we are not careful, may combine too much community with not enough community.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno ist Professor für Politische Wissenschaften und Direktor für Internationale Politik am Cour des Comptes, Paris.